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 Limited attention and income distribution
Abhijit V. Banerjee and Sendhil Mullainathan￿
Economists have long been interested in the idea that there is a direct circular relation
between poverty and low productivity, and not just one that is mediated by market failures,
usually in asset markets. The nutrition-based e¢ ciency wage model (Partha Dasgupta and
Debraj Ray, 1987) is the canonical example of models where this happens: However it
has been variously suggested (see for example T. N. Srinivasan, 1994) that the link from
nutrition to productivity and especially the link from productivity to nutrition is too weak
to be any more than a small part of the story. Partha Dasgupta himself acknowledges this
when he writes "nutrition-productivity construct provides a metaphor,..., for ... an economic
environment harboring poverty traps" (Partha Dasgupta, 1997, page 5).
We propose an alternative approach to this question based on the idea that attention
is a scarce resource that is important for productivity. Speci￿cally, people may not be
able to fully attend to their jobs if they are also worrying about problems at home and
being distracted in this way reduces productivity. But not paying attention at home is also
costly: early symptoms of a child￿ s sickness may go unnoticed; water may run out at the
end of the day; kerosene for lighting lamps at home might run out and make it hard to do
homework; etc. Finally, the extent to which home life distracts depends on the nature ofhome life. Speci￿cally, certain goods (e.g. a good baby sitter, a 24-hour piped water supply,
a connection to a power supply grid) can reduce the extent of home life distraction.
These three assumptions generate an interesting relation between income and produc-
tivity that is at the core of our model. The non-poor in this model, by virtue of owning
distraction-saving goods and services at home, are able to focus more on their work. Hence
they will be more productive at work and will be able to a⁄ord more distraction-saving
goods. This simple two-way relationship between income and productivity produces a dis-
continuity in the relation between human capital and earnings which is certain cases can
lead to a poverty trap, even in the absence of any market failures.
I The Model
I.1 Set Up.
A consumer can consume two types of goods: food f and comfort goods c, each costing
unit price. Normally they provide Cobb-Douglas utility c￿f1￿￿: With some probability ph
however there is a problem at home which reduces this utility by b ￿ c. Paying attention
at home reduces the cost of the problem: Speci￿cally, when ￿ units of attention are paid at
home, problems are caught with probability ￿. Problems caught early are assumed to have
no cost. Putting ll this together suggests total utility is: c￿f1￿￿ ￿ ph(1 ￿ ￿)(b ￿ c). The
second term is the probability of problem (ph) that is uncaught (1 ￿ ￿) multiplied by the
cost of uncaught problems (b ￿ c). To avoid dealing with what happens when c > b; we will
assume that in the relevant range of c; b ￿ c is always positive
2Individuals are endowed with human capital h which they use at work to earn income.
Absent a problem at work output equals h. Problems arise with probability pw and reduce
output by a fraction 1 ￿ ￿ if unnoticed. If an individual is attentive at work, problems are
caught and have no e⁄ect on output. For example, while milking an animal, an attentive
worker may notice the early signs of disease. The key to our model is that the amount of
attention a worker can pay at work depends on the attention he pays at home. For simplicity,
we model this distraction in an extreme way: the amount of attention available for work is
1￿￿, where ￿ is the attention used up at home. Given attentiveness 1￿￿ at work, problems
are caught with probability 1 ￿ ￿. Thus output as a whole is h(1 ￿ pw￿(1 ￿ ￿)). Which
re￿ ects the fact that a problem must arise (probability pw) be uncaught (probability ￿) to
reduce output (by fraction 1￿￿). We assume that problems at home and problems at work
arise independently.
The individual￿ s income y; it is assumed, equals the expected output that is the result of
the choice of ￿. This presumes that ￿ is contractable: the employee promises the employer
(or an insurance company) a particular value of ￿ and in return for full insurance. In a
companion paper we discuss, among other things, the case where ￿ is not contractable (see
Abhijit Banerjee and Sendhil Mullainathan (2008)).
The time line is as follows: the person ￿rst picks c and then selects ￿: Then problems
at home and at work occur and are either detected or not. Then output is realized. We
assume perfect credit markets, and ￿ is contractable so it does not matter whether he gets
his income at the beginning or after output is realized.
3I.2 Optimization
Since the consumer spends all income on one of the two goods, he therefore maximizes
Maxcc
￿(y ￿ c)
1￿￿ ￿ ph(1 ￿ ￿)(b ￿ c)
Subject to the constraint
y = h(1 ￿ pw￿(1 ￿ ￿))
The ￿rst order condition with respect to c is:
(1) (1 ￿ ￿)(
c
y ￿ c
)
￿ ￿ ￿(
y ￿ c
c
)
1￿￿ = ph(1 ￿ ￿):
Several basic facts that follow from this ￿rst order condition. First, the optimal amount of
comfort good is simply a fraction of income. This can be seen by simply noting that c = my
satis￿es the ￿rst order condition, combined with the fact that the maximand is strictly
concave and therefore has a unique maximizer. Therefore write c(￿;ph;y) = m(￿;ph)y.
Second, conditional on y, comfort good consumption is decreasing in ￿. To see why, note
that since c = my; the left hand side of the above ￿rst order condition does not depend
directly on ￿ but is increasing in m(￿;ph). The right hand side however is decreasing in ￿.
For the two sides to remain equal, m must go down when ￿ goes up. This is a key feature
of our model: comfort goods and attention towards home are substitutes. Finally, note that
because c is proportional to y; total utility is linear in y.
The previous analysis took ￿ as given. What determines the choice of ￿? It will be useful
to de￿ne U to be the total utility at the optimum given the exogenous parameters. De￿ning
U(￿) to be c(￿;ph;y)￿(y(￿) ￿ c(￿;ph;y))1￿￿ ￿ ph(1 ￿ ￿)(b ￿ c(￿;ph;y))The envelope theorem
4gives us that
dU(￿)
d￿
= (1 ￿ ￿)hpw(1 ￿ ￿)(
c(￿;ph;y)
y(￿) ￿ c(￿;y)
)
￿ + ph(b ￿ c(￿;ph;y)) (2)
= ￿(1 ￿ ￿)hpw(1 ￿ ￿)(
m(￿;ph)
1 ￿ m(￿;ph)
)
￿ + ph(b ￿ m(￿;ph)y(￿))) (3)
Increasing ￿ has two e⁄ects on U: (i) it decreases utility by decreasing income and thereby
overall consumption and (ii) it increases utility by increasing the chance of stopping a problem
at home. What is the shape of U(￿) function? Rewrite 1
(4) ￿(
1 ￿ m(￿;ph)
m(￿;ph)
)
1￿￿ + ph(1 ￿ ￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)(
m(￿;ph)
1 ￿ m(￿;ph)
)
￿:
Clearly (1 ￿ ￿)(
m(￿;ph)
1￿m(￿;ph))￿ must go down when ￿ goes up. Using this fact and the fact
that m(￿;ph) and y(￿) are both decreasing in ￿; it is clear that dU
d￿ must go up when ￿ goes
up. In other words, d2U
d￿2 > 0: Therefore there cannot be an interior optimum in ￿: In other
words, the maximization problem has a "bang-bang" solution: either the individual pays full
attention at home (￿ = 1) or full attention at work (￿ = 0).
This is a key result and is worth understanding well: Paying more attention at home
makes the person poorer and therefore less able to buy comfort goods. But having less
comfort goods makes the problems at home worse and this makes it even more important to
pay more attention at home. This makes the optimization problems non-convex and produces
a ￿bang-bang￿solution despite the fact that both the work and the home production functions
are linear as a function of ￿:
What determines the choice between ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1? The condition for choosing ￿ = 0
is simply that the person is better o⁄ there than at ￿ = 1; i.e.:
(5)
h(m(0;ph))
￿(1￿m(0;ph))
1￿￿￿ph(b￿m(0;ph)h) ￿ h(m(1;ph))
￿(1￿m(1;ph))
1￿￿(1￿pw(1￿￿)):
5II Implications for income distribution
It follows immediately from writing 5 in the form:
(6)
(m(0;ph))
￿(1￿m(0;ph))
1￿￿￿ph(
b
h
￿m(0;ph)) ￿ (m(1;ph))
￿(1￿m(1;ph))
1￿￿(1￿pw(1￿￿))
that people with higher h will choose ￿ = 0 all else being the same:Moreover for h close
to zero ￿ = 1 clearly dominates, while for h high enough ￿ = 0 will be chosen. Also by
our assumption that in the relevant range of h; b ￿ m(0;ph)h > 0; it follows that for any
particular value of h; if ￿ = 1 is chosen at any value of ph, it will be chosen at all higher
values of ph: We summarize this observation in
Proposition 1 For any ￿xed value of ph there will exist a threshold ￿ hc(ph) such that when
h ￿ hc(ph) people who face a probability ph of problems at work will pay full attention at
work. When h < hc(ph) they are inattentive at work. Also if for some combination of ph
and h; ￿ = 1 is chosen, then there exists a critical value of ph(h); pc
h 2 (0;1) such that for
ph ￿ pc
h(h), ￿ = 1 will be chosen by somone with human capital h but not otherwise
The ￿rst part of this says that richer people (i.e. people who start with a higher level of
human capital) will be pay more attention at work, which further boosts their income. As a
result while utility is continuous in h; there is a critical level of human capital where income
jumps discretely up and returns to human capital are convex, at least over a range. This
bifurcation is the core of this paper.The rich, by being able to a⁄ord more comfort goods,
increase their productivity and incomes even more than the poor. Thus, even with a linear
6production function and perfect credit markets, we have recreated the basic elements of a
poverty trap. Note however that in this view, it is income, not utility, where there is a jump.
So those right above and below the threshold earn very di⁄erent amounts but have similar
utility. The second part says that those who have more serious problems at home will be
less productive. Moreover an alternative interpretation of a higher value of ph is that there
are more problems at home that you care (and hence worry) about. This, combined with
the discontinuity in productivity suggest women￿ s earnings (though not their utility levels)
might be substantially lower than men￿ s earnings for the same level of human capital, just
because women care slightly more about problems at home. In a simple extension of the
model it can also be shown that those who are better at solving problems at home will have
lower productivity.
III Infrastructure and Productivity
The switch from ￿ = 0 to ￿ = 1; is accompanied by a jump in productivity. Hence this model
has a number of implications for productivity comparisons across countries. First, one of
the important sources of problems at home could be lack of access to quality infrastructure.
For example, unreliable electricity or water supply create the need for paying more attention
towards what is going on at the home. By providing more reliable public goods (i.e a
lower ph) countries therefore not only make people better o⁄ in welfare terms but also
generate higher productivity. Similarly better access to a power grid or a water-line might
increase productivity of the labor force. Of course in either case, these gains would need
weighed against the costs, but suggests an additional channel through which infrastructural
7improvement can bene￿t productivity and growth. Second, countries where the average
worker is better paid will have more productive workers: in other words, this will be true
even if the di⁄erence in pay has nothing to do with productivity. More generally there is a
virtuous cycle that runs from higher productivity to higher pay to even higher productivity.
IV Occupational Choice
The results so far presume that there is only one job available. It is natural, however,
to examine the sorting consequences of distraction. Imagine there are two potential jobs
available. One job (the high responsibility job) is more productive but su⁄ers more from
distraction. This job produces ￿h where ￿ > 1 and has probability pw of failures which
cots a fraction ￿ of output. The other (the low responsibility job) is less productive but
su⁄ers less from distraction. It has output equal to h but has no chance of failures. Suppose
that the worker ￿rst chooses a job and then choose ￿. Assume that(￿ ￿ 1) < pw(1 ￿ ￿)￿;.
Under this assumption it is worth noting that at low levels of attention to work 1 ￿ ￿ = 0
the low responsibility job produces more output and would be chosen. On the other hand
because ￿ > 1, at full attention to work (1￿￿ = 1) the high responsibility job produces more
output and would be chosen. This type of reasoning combined with the argument behind
Proposition 1 implies:
Proposition 2 If there is a high responsibility high productivity job and a low responsibility
low return job, there will be a threshold h0 such that people with h ￿ h0 people will choose the
high responsibility job and pay full attention at work while those with h < h0 individuals will
choose the low responsibility job and pay less than full attention at work.
8This says that the reason we observe people with low human capital specializing in
industries like agriculture may be that the margin of error in agriculture tends to be relatively
large (with most crops small delays in when you water them or when you put in fertilizer
does not matter too much), which allows them to focus on problems of home life.
A simple extension of the model also predicts that people with low levels of human capital
or high sensitivity to problems at home would select into occupations where they are in a
position to easily solve problems at home. Thus women might select into low productivity
occupations that o⁄er them the option of be close to home
V Income dynamics
This section draws out the dynamic consequences of Proposition 1, which says that small
di⁄erences in human capital can have large consequences for income.
We now show that in an inter-generational model these inequalities translate into per-
sistent income di⁄erences. Assume that people get human capital from their parents: A
fraction ￿ of the amount of food consumed by their parents goes to the children and their
human capital is a multiple ￿ of the amount of food that was allocated to them plus a
constant ￿.
For production make the assumptions we made for the two jobs model in the last section:
The result in that model was that those who have low h choose the low responsibility job
while the rest choose the high responsibility job. In equilibrium neither job carries any
risk since the former is inherently risk-less and the latter is only chosen by people who
give it full attention. Denote by hc the value of h where the switch happens. Hence the
9inter-generational dynamics of human capital can be written as:
ht+1 = ￿ + ￿￿(1 ￿ m(1;ph))h￿ for h < h
c (7)
= ￿ + ￿￿(1 ￿ m(0;ph))￿h￿ for h ￿ h
c
These dynamics are represented in ￿gure 1 for the case where (1￿m(0;ph))￿ >.(1￿m(1;ph))
(it is easily checked that this case is possible). The line through the origin has a slope of
1: It represents the equation ht+1 = ht: The broken line with a jump at h￿ represents the
dynamics of ht: The line AB represents the equation ht+1 = ￿+￿￿(1￿m(1;ph))h￿ while the
line CD represents the equation ￿ + ￿￿(1 ￿ m(0;ph))￿h￿. Clearly, as drawn, there are two
stable steady state values of h: those dynasties that start low converge to the lower value
while those who start high stay high. In other words, there is a poverty trap here despite
the fact that all markets work perfectly.
For simplicity, we assumed a speci￿c the bequest prreference to get this result. Because
children￿ s utility does not directly enter parental preferences, we ignore the possibility that
parents may spend extra to help children acquire additional human capital. However the
10presence of a discontinuity implies that a poverty-trap could exist even if parents did care
about their children￿ s welfare.
VI Conclusion
This paper introduces a simple model of how home life and work life interact through limited
attention with important implications for the distribution of income. While distractions and
deviations from rationality are obviously related, our model does not rely on any of these
deviations. Instead, the psychological insights help us motivate a richer preference structure
within a rational choice model. In fact our model is formally identical to a rational time-
allocation, if we think of comfort goods as time-saving devices. In other words, our result
could be read as saying that time spent working jumps up as human capital goes up. However
according to Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Du￿ o (2008), the evidence that the poor work less
hours than the non-poor tends to be patchy and the di⁄erences in hours worked tend to be
small. If time-use has to be a signi￿cant part of the explanation of the observed di⁄erences,
it must be the quality of time-use (i.e. attention) rather than the quantity, that matters.
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